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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting into evidence the testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody
Christensen and Colleen Mark, particularly where the court had
previously and correctly ruled such testimony inadmissible?
a.

Whether the original Order in Limine excluding the

prior and subsequent slip and fall accidents was a correct ruling
of law?
b.

Whether the admission of such testimony on the

very last day of trial constituted surprise which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against, and thus prejudiced
Wasatch's defense.
2.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error

by giving Jury Instruction No. 20 over the objection of counsel
for Wasatch Manor, Inc., causing the jury to improperly apply a
higher standard of care to Wasatch Manor, Inc.?
3.

Whether the court committed reversible error by

refusing to grant Wasatch Manor, Inc.'s Motion for a New Trial?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation would
determine the issues at hand.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action was instituted by the PlaintiffRespondent, Guy Erickson, against Defendant-Appellant, Wasatch
Manor, Inc. ("Wasatch"), who operates the Wasatch Manor
Apartments in Salt Lake City.

Erickson claimed that he was

injured on February 9, 1985 when, while a resident of the Wasatch
Manor Apartments, he slipped and fell on ice in the upper level
of the Wasatch Manor Apartments parking lot.
Prior to the trial of this action, Wasatch moved the
trial court (Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) for an Order In Limine
excluding from evidence the testimony of four (4) witnesses
regarding prior and subsequent slip and fall accidents allegedly
occurring on the Wasatch Manor Apartments parking lot.

It was

Wasatch's contention that the prior and subsequent slip and
fall accidents were not admissible because Erickson could not
show that they occurred under substantially similar conditions as
his own fall.

The trial court granted Wasatch's Motion In

Limine, and ruled that the testimony would not be admissible
-2

unless Erickson established that the parking structure was
defectively designed or constructed.
On the third and last day of trial, however, the court
reconsidered its Order In Limine upon the Motion of Erickson's
counsel, Eric Bjorklund.

Despite the fact that Erickson had

made no showing of a defect in the construction of the Wasatch
Manor parking lot, the court decided to admit the testimony of
prior and subsequent falls against the objections of counsel for
Wasatch.
In addition, against the objections of counsel for
Wasatch that Jury Instruction No. 20 was an incorrect statement
of landlord/tenant law in Utah, the court instructed the jury
that a landlord has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain
the common walkways in a reasonably safe condition for tenants
and guests, and that a landlord has a further duty to observe any
dangerous condition known to him and to take reasonable steps to
remedy or remove any such dangerous condition.
On May 19, 1989 the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Guy Erickson, and judgment was entered on June 13, 1989.
Thereafter, Wasatch filed a timely motion for a new trial,
arguing that the admission of the testimony regarding the prior
and subsequent falls constituted surprise and that the trial
court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 20.

By Minute Entry

dated August 7, 1989, and an Order dated September 19, 1989,
Judge Wilkinson denied Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial.
-3-

Appellant Wasatch Manor, Inc. filed its Notice of Appeal on
October 19, 1989.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wasatch Manor, Inc., operates the Wasatch Manor
Apartments at 535 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
60).

(R.

Erickson's Complaint (which was amended by Order of

the trial court dated May 16, 1989) alleged that on February 9,
1985, while a resident of the Wasatch Manor Apartments, he
slipped and fell on ice in the upper level of the Wasatch Manor
parking lot.

(R. 2, 214). Erickson brought this action to

recover for injuries allegedly resulting from the February 9,
1985 slip and fall.

(R. 2-7, 214)

According to Erickson's Complaint, the upper level of
the Wasatch Manor parking lot is constructed in such a way that
water from snow runs down the middle of the parking lot.
(R. 3, 75, 214, 444 at p.12).

It was alleged that on February 9

1985, the upper terrace had been cleared of snow, and snow was
piled in one area of the upper terrace.

(R. 3, 214). Erickson

further alleged that on February 9, 1985, the snow pile melted,
the water ran down the middle of the parking lot, and froze
during the night.

(R. 3-4, 214). Further, the Complaint allege

that around 11:15 p.m., Erickson fell on this ice which
traversed the length of the parking lot, and that due to poor

-4-

lighting, Erickson did not see the ice before he fell.

(R. 4,

444 at p.12).
Wasatch Manor and Salt Lake County had entered into a
contract, whereby Salt Lake County paid Wasatch Manor for the
privilege of its employees to park in the Wasatch Manor
Apartments1 parking lot.

(R. 61). Four County employees claimed

to have fallen on ice or snow in the parking lot.

(R. 61-64,

438, 439, 441). Deposition testimony revealed the following
information regarding the alleged falls of these four witnesses.
Colleen Mark, an employee of the Salt Lake County
Treasurer's Office, claimed that she fell in November of 1984 on
ice in the Wasatch Manor Apartments' parking lot.
6).

(R. 439 at p.

Ms. Mark claimed that on this occasion she was just getting

ready to go to work.

(Id. at p. 10.)

She parked on the east

side of the parking lot and was about an inch away from her car
when she fell.

(Id. at pp. 6-7.)

Ms. Mark did not report

her fall to Wasatch Manor, but reported it to her supervisor at
the County Treasurer's office.

(Id. at 11.)

Wanda Jo Christensen, an employee of Salt Lake
County Assessor's office, claimed to have fallen twice at the
Wasatch Manor parking lot.

Her first fall allegedly occurred

sometime between 1968 and 1971.

(R. 438 at p. 5).

Ms. Christensen alleged that she fell while walking down a ramp,
at a time when there was both ice and snow on the ground. (Id.
at 6.)

Ms. Christensen did not report this fall to Wasatch
-5-

Manor.

(Id. at 7.)

1984 and 1985.

The second fall allegedly occurred between

(Id. at p. 5.)

Ms. Christensen had parked in a

spot alongside of the building, and fell right near the door that
goes into the Wasatch Manor Apartments.

Ms. Christensen did not

report her fall to Wasatch Manor, but asked the manager if she
could walk through the lobby instead of walking down the ramp.
(Id. at 11.)
Rebecca Helms testified at her deposition that she
parked on the west side of the upper-level parking lot along the
building.

(R. 441 at p. 8). Ms. Helms claims to have fallen

several times.
ago.

(Id.).

Her first fall occurred about thirteen years

At that time, she was parked on the immediately

next available space on the east side of the row of parking
spaces alongside the building.

Ms. Helms allegedly fell on ice

by the side of her car in the morning as she was going to work.
Ms. Helms did not report the fall to Wasatch Manor. (Id. at 17,
18.)

Ms. Helms' second fall probably occurred within the eight

years prior to her October 1987 deposition.

(Id. at 8.)

This

fall allegedly occurred around 8:00 a.m., farther north on the
parking lot as Ms. Helms was going down the ramp.
14.)

(Id. at

The snow had not been removed, but the ice was visible.

(Id. at 15.)

Ms. Helms did not report it to Wasatch Manor, but

believes she spoke to a person who loaded the garbage regarding
the treatment of ice.

(:rd. at 16, 17.)

Ms. Helms1 most recent

fall allegedly occurred in November or December of 1986. (Id.
-6-

at 8.)

On this particular occasion, Ms. Helms parked on the west

side of the parking lot along the building, and she was right
behind her car when she fell. (Id. at 8, 10.)

This fall also

occurred around 8:00 a.m., while there was both snow and ice in
the parking lot.

It was not reported to Wasatch Manor.

(Id.

at 11, 13.)
Carol Back claimed that in the late 1970's, she fell
by the ramp.

She had parked along the east side of the parking

lot, and walked towards the ramp, and was quite a distance from
her car when she fell.

(R. 63-64, 444 at pp.708).

Ms. Back

could see the ice in the parking lot before she fell.
63-64).

(R.

Ms. Back failed to report the fall to Wasatch Manor.

(Id.)
Based upon the deposition testimony of the four
witnesses, Wasatch moved the trial court for an Order in Limine
excluding the testimony on the grounds that the prior and
subsequent falls did not occur under circumstances substantially
similar to Erickson's fall, and therefore were not relevant and
or probative of Erickson's theories.

(R. 58-59).

In its

Memorandum in Support of the Motion and at the hearing on the
Motion, Wasatch pointed out that the depositions of the four
County employees revealed that these witnesses could not pinpoint
the dates of their alleged falls, that these falls were remote in
time and some of them may have occurred more than thirteen years
prior to the depositions, that the falls occurred in areas of the
-7-

parking lot other than the depressed area where Erickson
allegedly fell, and that none of the witnesses reported any of
their falls to Wasatch Manor personnel.

(R. 60-71).

The Court ruled that such testimony would not be
admitted absent a showing that the design or construction of the
parking structure was defective.

The Court's Ruling stated:

As far as the last issue is concerned, I
have not made a study of the slip and fall
cases as far as these prior accidents are
concerned. I know I have had some
experience as far as an automobile accident
where there is a particular location in the
highway of where a number of accidents have
taken place. And I have not reviewed that
either prior to taking the bench on this,
but I do remember some of the things they
say. And one of this is notice.
I do know that whether notice was given
to the city, the highway department, and so
forth as far as a dangerous condition is
concerned, another thing they look at is
the time element, whether it was one
month, six months, five years, ten years
and so forth. And of course the main
thing is whether the condition was the
same, the road signs were the same, the
designation of the road, the line down the
center of the road, and so forth, and
things of this sort.
Well, this gets very difficult when you
start talking about falls of 13, 15, 18
years ago. And I am ^oing to rule this
way: That if the plaintiff has evidence
to show that there is, and he claims there
is a dangerous condition which exists in
that parking lot, engineering,
construction where it was negligently
constructed, where they made something that
was negligent or defective and that people
have fallen as a result of that, then I
would allow prior falls.
-8-

If these prior falls are not in that same
location as far as the depressed area of
which he alleges is defective, such as
going down the ramp or such as the other
part of it, I just can't allow it. They
are just not relevant as far as the
situation is concerned. They may have
fallen, and even some of them may have been
five or ten years ago.
But if he can tie it in to a defective
condition in construction, something of a
negligent nature, then I will allow it
within the same area. And it sounds like
to me there is only one that does this, and
that's the one on the west side of where
somebody walked out in back of their car
and fell.
* * * * * * *

And I won't even allow that unless it can
be shown that there was a defect as far as
the construction which caused ice to form
and people have been falling there. Of
course that's even weak because still they
didn't give notice to the principle,
Wasatch Manor.
. . . . So I hope you understand my
ruling. I am saying that I will not allow
the prior falls unless it can be
established that there was a defective
condition there and they were falling as a
result of that defective engineered
condition.
(Emphasis added R. 443, attached as Appendix A ) .
On the last day of trial, even though Erickson had
not introduced any testimony, expert or otherwise, regarding the
design or construction of the parking structure, Erickson's
counsel moved the Court to reconsider its prior Order based upon
the affidavits of two witnesses.

(R. 184-194).

The Affidavit of

Rebecca Helms stated that she fell into the depressed area of the
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parking lot during the month of January 1985 or February of
1985.

(R. 188). This statement was in contradiction to her

deposition testimony that the most recent fall she had at the
Wasatch Manor parking lot was in November or December of 1986,
and the fall prior to that was sometime in the eight years prior
to her deposition which was taken in October of 1987.

(R. 441 at

p. 8). Furthermore, Ms. Helms' deposition testimony made no
mention of falling into the depressed area of the parking lot.
(R. 441 at pp. 8-15).

The Helms Affidavit also stated that

within days of the supposed fall in January or February of 1985,
she notified a man who worked for Wasatch and who was loading
garbage at the time that the parking lot was icy and that she had
fallen.

(R. 188). This statement is again in contradiction to

Helms' deposition testimony that she did not report the November
or December 1986 fall to Wasatch personnel.
13).

(R. 441 at p. 11,

Ms. Helms' testified at her deposition that she had fallen

three times on the Wasatch parking lot, but the only fall
regarding which she spoke to the Wasatch employee who was loading
garbage was the fall that occurred within the eight years prior
to the taking of her deposition in October of 1987.

(R. 441 at

pp. 8, 16-17).
Similarly, the Affidavit of Jody Christensen stated
that during the last two weeks of December 1984 or during the
month of January 1985 she had fallen in the location marked with
a dotted line on a diagram attached to the Affidavit.
-10-

(R. 192,

the Affidavit of Jody Christensen is attached as Appendix B.)
The diagram seems to indicate that the fall occurred in the same
depressed area in which Erickson allegedly fell.
Appendix B).

(R. 194,

This statement is in contradiction to Ms.

Christensen's deposition wherein she testified that she could
not recall whether the fall occurred in 1984 or 1985, let alone
recall the month in which the fall occurred.
15).

(R. 438 at pp. 5,

In addition, in her deposition, Ms. Christensen repeatedly

testified that she could not recall specifically where the fall
occurred, but remembered only that it occurred near the door to
the Wasatch Manor Apartments close to the cars parked alongside
the west row of parking spaces.

(R. 438 at pp. 8-10, 15-16).

Christensen1s Affidavit further stated that within a few days
of her fall in December of 1984 or January of 1985, she told the
manager of the Wasatch Manor Apartments that she had fallen and
that the parking lot was unreasonably icy.

(R. 192). However,

at the time of her deposition, Christensen testified that she did
not report the fall to anyone at Wasatach Manor.

She only

asked the manager if she could walk through the lobby instead of
walking down the ramp.

(R. 438, at p. 11).

The court thereafter held a hearing in the absence of
the jury on Erickson1s Motion to Reconsider.

Nelson Hayes,

counsel for Wasatch, vigorously objected to the admission of the
testimony, arguing that the affidavits were in contradiction to
the prior depositions, and that the admission of the testimony at
-11-

that point would be surprise to Wasatch who had relied on the
court's prior Order and was not adequately prepared to
cross-examine the surprise witnesses and to properly prepare
Wasatch's defense.

(R. 446 at pp. 52-56).

In spite of

Wasatch's objections and in spite of the court's prior Order
which specifically excluded testimony regarding other falls
unless it could be shown that the parking lot was defectively
constructed and that the falls occurred around the same time
and in the same area as where Mr. Erickson allegedly fell,
the court admitted the testimony into evidence.

The court stated:

I could stop it if it was not within the
relative time. But it appears that this is
within that time limit. So that is just
admissible testimony, regardless. And so I
can't do anything about it. As far as the
falls are concerned, that the falls, if they
can be related to the time and similar
situations, then that is also admissible.
And if these falls took place, and based on
what the testimony has been of the two
principles of Wasatch Manor, if these falls
have been during the '84-'85 season, and
they were slipped on ice, the Court would
allow testimony as far as falls. (Id. at
pp. 55-56).
Erickson's counsel then called witnesses Rebecca
Helms, Jody Christensen and Colleen Mark, each of whom
testified regarding their falls on the Wasatch Manor parking
lot.

At trial Ms. Helms and Ms. Christensen both pinpointed

their falls as having occurred in the same month or the month
prior to Erickson's fall.

(R. 446 at pp. 64, 87). They
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further testified that they had in fact reported their falls to
Wasatch Manor.

Id. at pp. 62-63, 89). They even went so far

as to identify Art Kersey in the court room as the Wasatch
Manor employee with whom they spoke.

(Id.)

Wasatch's counsel thereafter presented the defense of
Wasatch through the testimony of Burton Miller, the manager of
the Wasatch Manor Apartments, and Art Kersey, the engineer
employed by Wasatch Manor Apartments.
121-140).

(R. 446 at pp.

Wasatch's counsel did not call any witnesses to

rebut the testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody Christensen and
Colleen Mark.
At the trial of this matter, against the objections of
Wasatch's counsel, the Court gave Jury Instruction No. 20,
which states in pertinent part:
The defendant has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to maintain the common
walkways in reasonably safe condition for
tenants and guests. The defendant has a
further duty to observe any dangerous
condition known to him or which by the use
of reasonable diligence would have become
known to him and to take reasonable steps
to remedy or remove any such dangerous
condition.
(Emphasis added, R. 223-256, Jury Instruction No. 20 has been
reproduced in its entirety and attached as Appendix C.)
On May 19, 1989, the jury returned a verdict finding
Wasatch Manor, Inc. negligent.

The jury awarded a total

verdict of $84,820.15 to Erickson.

-13-

(R. 446 at pp. 201-205).

On June 13, 1989, Judgment was entered on the verdict.

(R.

280-281, attached as Appendix D).
On June 23, 1989, Wasatch filed a timely Motion for
a New Trial on the grounds that the admission of the testimony
of Christensen, Helms, and Mark on the last day of trial
constituted surprise which prejudiced Wasatch's defense, and
also on the grounds that Jury Instruction No. 20 incorrectly
stated the standard of care required of a landlord.
373-386).

(R.

Wasatch presented its position and arguments to the

court by filing a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
thereafter filing a Reply Memorandum in response to
Erickson's memorandum objecting to the Motion.
409-414).

(R. 373-384,

On August 7, 1989, Judge Wilkinson issued a

Minute Entry denying Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial.

(R.

419, attached is Appendix E). The Minute Entry does not state
the reasons for the court's denial of Wasatch's Motion.
(Id.).

An Order to the same effect was entered on September

19, 1989.

(R. 420-421).
Wasatch hereby appeals from the judgment entered

against it on June 13, 1989, and from the court's Order dated
September 19, 1989, denying Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial.
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SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT
Wasatch appeals from the Judgment entered on
September 19, 1989 on the grounds that (1) the testimony of
Rebecca Helms, Jody Christensen and Colleen Mark was
improperly admitted, and (2) that the Court improperly
instructed the jury as to the standard of care required of a
landlord.

The trial court erred in admitting testimony which

it had expressly excluded by its prior Order in Limine,

The

admission of such evidence was an abuse of discretion, because
were it not for the improper admission, the jury would not
have returned the verdict that it did against Wasatch.
First, the original Order of the trial court excluding the
testimony was the correct ruling in light of the law regarding
the admissibility of prior and subsequent accidents.
Secondly, the admission of such testimony in total
contradiction to the prior Order was a complete surprise to
appellant Wasatch, whose counsel had prepared Wasatch's
defense with reliance upon the court's prior Order.
Furthermore, because the trial court had the change of heart
on the very last day of trial, at the very end of Erickson's
presentation of his case, Wasatch was unable to produce
rebuttal witnesses to contradict the surprise testimony.
The Court improperly instructed the jury that the
defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the
-15-

common walkways in a reasonably safe condition, and had a
further duty to observe any dangerous condition known to him
and take reasonable steps to remedy the condition.

This

instruction essentially created a strict liability type of
standard for Wasatch, because it imposed an additional duty
beyond ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, and
that was the duty to observe specific conditions and remove
them.

This is an erroneous instruction under Utah

landlord/tenant law and it prejudiced Wasatch.
Finally, Wasatch appeals from the trial court's
order denying its motion for a new trial.

Wasatch argued to

the court by memorandums of law that it had met all the
elements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(3), and
that it was entitled to a new trial on the grounds of
surprise.

Wasatch also argued to the court that Jury

Instruction No. 2 0 was improper.

The court, however, denied

Wasatch's Motion without indicating its reasons therefore.
Wasatch was clearly entitled to a new trial.
the Motion was an abuse of discretion.

-16-

The denial of

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY
PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED BY THE COURT'S ORDER IN LIMINE.
The proper standard of review on appeal for a trial
court's admission of evidence is abuse of discretion.

Rule

L03(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that, "Error may
lot be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
mless a substantial right of the party is affected."

Thus, a

brial court's determination of admissibility can be reversed when
It is shown that the trial court abused its discretion, and that
bhat abuse of discretion affected a party's substantial rights.
Sardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924-925 (Utah App. 1989);
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989).

In

determining whether a substantial right of the party is affected,
an appellate court must decide whether there is a reasonable
Likelihood that a different result would have been reached absent
bhe error.

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1285 (Utah

\pp. 1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319
(Utah App. 1988); State v. Speer# 750 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah
L988).
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A.

The Original Order in Limine Excluding the Prior and
Subsequent Slip and Falls Was a Correct Ruling of Lav.
The admissibility of prior accidents is totally within

the discretion of the trial judge.

American Broadcasting

Companies, Inc. v. Kenai Air of Hawaii, Inc., 686 P.2d 1, 5
(Hawaii 1984); Burgbacher v. Mellor, 112 Ariz. 481, 543
P.2d 1110, 1112 (1975).

However, the general rule is that

evidence of prior similar incidents may be admissible when
offered for a valid purpose, when relevant to a material issue,
and when its probative value outweighs any prejudice resulting
from its admission.

Jacobs v. Commonwealth Highland Theaters,

Inc., 738 P.2d 6, 9 (Colo. App. 1986).

A valid purpose

includes attempts to prove a defective or dangerous condition and
to establish notice.

Before evidence of prior incidents may be

admitted, it must be shown that the conditions under which the
previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially
similar to the one in question.

Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387,

393 (Hawaii 1986); Burgbacher v. Mellor, 543 P.2d at 1112;
State v. Stewart, 12 Utah 2d 273, 365 P.2d 785, 786 (1961).
The same is true in determining the admissibility of subsequent
accidents.

Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981);

Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So.2d 245 (Fla. App.
1984) .
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Evidence that would merely prove that many accidents
had occurred at a particular place, or that such location was an
accident-prone location is properly excludable.

State v.

Stewart, 36 P.2d at 786.

There must be a showing of substantial

similarity of conditions.

Furthermore, even accidents which are

proven to have occurred under substantially similar
circumstances may be excluded if the danger of unfair surprise,
prejudice, confusion of the issues or the consideration of undue
consumption of time is disproportionate to the probative value
of the evidence.

Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d at 393. The

following factors are important in determining whether sufficient
similarity of circumstances exists in order to make the prior
or subsequent accidents admissible:

The nature of the accidents,

their location, the time of day, the quality of lighting, the
condition of the premises, and the time difference between the
prior accidents and the accident in question.

Jacobs, 738

P.2d at 10.
Due to substantial differences between Erickson's
fall and the alleged slip and falls of the witnesses, the prior
and subsequent accidents lacked probative value and should not
have been admitted into evidence.

The witnesses1 deposition

testimony indicated that their slip and falls occurred in
locations different from the location where Erickson fell.
Erickson claimed that he fell on ice collected in a "depressed
area" of the parking lot which runs in a north and southerly
-19-

direction immediately east of the first row of parking spaces
along the west side of the parking lot.

Ms. Mark testified that

her fall occurred on the far east side of the parking lot.
Ms. Christensen allegedly fell once while walking down a ramp,
and a second time on the far west side of the parking lot.
According to Ms. Helms, she first fell about thirteen years ago
on the east

w of parking spaces, which would be east of the

"depressed area."

Ms. Helms' second fall occurred on the north

side of the parking lot as she was going down a ramp.

Ms. Helms

claimed to have fallen a third time after she parked on the far
west side of the parking lot and walked behind her car towards
the north end of the lot.

Ms. Back's fall occurred by the ramp.

Thus, the only fall that might have occurred near the
location of Erickson's fall was Ms. Helm's fall as she was
walking behind her car.

However, none of the witnesses,

including Ms. Helms, testified at their depositions that they
fell in a "depressed area."

None of the witnesses could specify

a specific day or even month and only generally a time of day.
Therefore, these other slip and falls were not probative of
Erickson's theory that the condition of the parking lot created
a hazardous depressed area where ice accumulated.
Secondly, the prior and subsequent accidents occurred
at a different time of day than Erickson's fall.

Erickson

testified that he fell at 11:15 p.m. and that due to poor
lighting, he did not see the ice upon which he fell.
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However,

depositions of the witnesses indicated that they all fell during
daylight, around 8 a.m.

Furthermore, they had all testified

their depositions that they saw the ice before they fell. The
conditions of the parking lot may vary greatly between 8:00 a.m.
and 11:15 p.m.

Furthermore, since the witnesses saw the ice upon

which they fell, this testimony was not helpful to prove
plaintiff's theory that ice accumulated in a depressed area and
that he didn't see the ice.
The condition of the premises is another substantial
difference between Erickson's fall and the prior and subsequent
accidents.

In the case of Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732

P.2d 369 (Idaho App. 1987), plaintiff was a social guest who
suffered injury when he slipped and fell on ice covering the
front steps of defendants' residence.

At trial, plaintiff

attempted to introduce testimony of a woman who allegedly
slipped, but did not fall on the same steps approximately one
month prior to Evans' accident.

732 P.2d at 371.

that the testimony was inadmissible.

The court held

The court reasoned that

changing weather, as well as intervening foot traffic on the
steps, would have altered their condition so greatly that any
evidence of that condition one month before the accident would
lack probative value.
Weather conditions may vary greatly from year to year,
month to month, even day to day.

In this case, the witnesses

claimed that their slip and falls occurred as far as thirteen
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years prior to the slip and fall in question.

During that time,

conditions in the parking lot would have changed dramatically due
to changing weather, a change in the amount of snowfall, change
in the procedures for removal of snow and icing of the parking
lot, and differing amounts of vehicle or foot traffic in the
parking lot.

According to the Evans v. Park analysis, these

alleged accidents lacked probative value and should not have been
admitted into evidence.
Finally, the prior and subsequent accidents should not
have been admitted into evidence because they lacked a proper
foundation.

In Burgbacher v. Mellor, plaintiff's decedent

died as a result of brain injuries suffered when he slipped and
fell while hurrying across a wet exterior sidewalk near the north
entrance of a medical building.

At trial, the deposition

testimony of a former maintenance man was read to the jury.

The

testimony was to the effect that one day the witnesses' wife
almost slipped on the wet sidewalk.

The court held that this

testimony should not have been admitted into evidence, as proper
foundation had not been established.

"The fact that the woman

almost slipped was put before the jury but when she slipped was
not clear and therefore, a proper foundation for the evidence was
not laid."

543 P.2d at 1112, emphasis added.
The witnesses in this case could not pinpoint, at the

time of their depositions, when their falls occurred.
Therefore, Burchbacher dictates that the prior and subsequent
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accidents were inadmissible because they lacked proper
foundation.

The trial court properly ruled such testimony

inadmissible unless and until Erickson made a showing that the
parking lot was defectively constructed, and even so, only those
falls that occurred within the same time period and within the
same area of the parking lot as Erickson1s fall would be
admitted.

(R. 443, Appendix A ) .
The court should not have reversed its prior Order in

Limine upon Ericksonfs Motion to Reconsider.

Ericksonfs

Motion for reconsideration was based upon the affidavits of
Jody Christensen and Rebecca Helms.

As indicated under the

Facts Statement of this brief, these affidavits were in
contradiction to the prior deposition testimony of Ms.
Christensen and Ms. Helms.

It is well established that as a

matter of general evidence law, a deposition is a more reliable
means of ascertaining the truth than an affidavit.

Guardian

State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Utah 1988);
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).

This is

because a deponent is subject to cross-examination while an
affiant is not.

Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172.

Secondly,

regardless of the existence of the affidavits, the court's Order
in Limine had expressly stated that before the slip and falls
would be admitted, Erickson had to show a defect in the design
or construction of the parking lot.

(R. 443, Appendix A).

Erickson clearly failed to make such a showing during the
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presentation of his case and even upon his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order in Limine.

Because the conditions

established by the court had not been met, the testimony of
Jody Christensen, Rebecca Helms and Colleen Mark should not
have been admitted.
B.

The Admission of the Testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody
Christensen^ and Colleen Mark on the Very Last Day of the
Trial Constituted Surprise Which Ordinary Prudence Could Not
Have Guarded Against, and it Greatly Prejudiced Wasatch's
Defense.
Assuming, arguendo, that the other falls were

substantially similar to Erickson's fall, the trial court
committed reversible error in admitting the testimony in
contradiction to its prior Order when there was no opportunity
for Wasatch to arrange for rebuttal testimony.

The admission of

such testimony constituted surprise which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against and prejudiced Wasatch's defense.
Wasatch's counsel had properly conducted discovery and deposed
witnesses Christensen, Helms, and Mark to obtain a complete
understanding of the facts and to properly prepare and evaluate
Wasatch's defense.

Based upon these depositions, Wasatch

brought a Motion in Limine to exclude the prior and subsequent
falls.

After successfully securing the court's Order in Limine,

Wasatch's counsel relied upon the guidelines set forth in the
court's Order in preparing for trial.

However, nothing that

Wasatch's counsel could do could have prepared it for the
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sudden reversal of the Order in Limine which took place on the
last day of trial.
The court's admission of the testimony of Rebecca
Helms, Jody Christensen, and Colleen Mark constituted a
surprise for several reasons.

First of all, Erickson's counsel

intentionally waited until the last day of trial to notify
Wasatch's counsel and the court that his witnesses had changed
their testimony.

Although in his opening statements, Mr.

Bjorklund told the jury that he might call several witnesses
that will talk about the parking lot, Bjorklund refused to
reveal to the court and to Wasatch's counsel his theory for
overcoming the court's Order in Limine.

(R. 445 at p. 13).

However, around 11:30 a.m. on the last day of trial, Mr.
Bjorklund presented his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
in Limine along with the affidavits of Jody Christensen and
Rebecca Helms.

It was later learned at trial, upon

cross-examination of Ms. Helms,

that Mr. Bjorklund knew that

Ms. Helms and Ms. Christensen would change their testimony almost
three weeks before the trial.

(R. 446 at p. 76). Thus,

Wasatch's counsel was genuinely surprised that Ms. Helms and
Ms. Christensen changed their deposition testimony.
Secondly, the admission of this testimony constituted
surprise to Wasatch because it had no way of preparing for the
eventuality that the court might reverse its Order, particularly
where the guidelines set forth in the Order had not been met.
-25-

As

stated previously, the court's oral Ruling on Wasatch's Motion
in Limine clearly stated that before evidence of the prior slip
and falls could be admitted, Erickson had to show that there
was a defect in the construction or design of the Wasatch Manor
parking lot.

The ruling further stated that in the event that

Erickson made such a showing, the court would admit into
evidence only those falls that occurred within the same time
period and the same area of the parking lot as Erickson's
fall.

(R. 443, attached as Appendix A).

Erickson's Motion for

Reconsideration and the attached affidavits were mere attempts to
show that the prior falls of Christensen and Helms occurred at
the same time period and the same area in the parking lot as
Erickson's fall.

At no time during the trial or upon

Erickson's Motion for Reconsideration did he make a showing
that the parking lot was defectively constructed.
At the hearing held by the court on Erickson's Motion
for Reconsideration, counsel for Wasatch, Nelson Hayes, objected
to the admission of such evidence and argued that the admission
of the testimony was a complete surprise.

Mr. Hayes stated:

Your Honor, our position basically is
unchanged from when it was argued before
your Honor on April 5, 1989. It's our
position that these falls, and particularly
as indicated in the affidavit is the
reputation of the parking lot, is of no
probative value. And he can't lay
foundation that it had anything to do
whatever in the fall Mr. Erickson had on a
specific night and specific day.
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As to the remainder of it having to do with
some form of impeachment value, the only
thing I can say is I would believe that it
would at this point and time, for me,
constitute surprise. And the reason it
does, your Honor, is, I took the depositions
of these women and in good faith, relied
upon what they were telling me in
preparation of this case and in evaluating
the case and in doing what I had to do.
Then, prior to trial, I brought a motion in
limine to determine whether indeed they were
going to be able to testify.
The affidavit now states that their
testimony has changed from their deposition
testimony. Because they have had an
opportunity now, within the last few days,
to review with plaintiff's counsel the facts
of the case. I haven't had—I won't have an
opportunity until they get on the stand to
understand or know the reasons for their
decision to change their testimony.
And in most circumstances, an affidavit
offered to rebut one's prior deposition
testimony is subject to a motion to strike
anyway. And I can't adequately prepare by
hearing, even at the beginning of the trial
their names that he was still planning to
call them and an explanation today that they
have now changed their deposition testimony,
to adequately prepare to cross-examine them
and do what I need to do to defend my
clients.
So, I would strictly resist them testifying
at this point in the trial. I can't fairly
and dutifully as a lawyer agree to it
without taking a strong resistance, based on
my inability to prepare for some change that
I am not aware of.
I went through the process of taking
depositions and trying to ascertain what the
facts were.
(R. 446 at pp. 51-53).
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Wasatch was greatly prejudiced by the admission of the
surprise testimony.

Because Wasatch was faced with the changed

testimony at the last minute, it was not prepared to
cross-examine these witnesses and to arrange for rebuttal
testimony.

Wasatch was precluded from learning the reasons or

the inducement for the witnesses' change in their testimony
without doing so in front of the jury.

It was precluded from

knowing what their trial testimony would actually be.

Wasatch

did not know what questions to ask of these witnesses, because it
did not know how the questions would be answered by the
witnesses.

Thus, Wasatch was required, essentially, to do a

discovery deposition in front of the jury.

Finally, Wasatch had

no opportunity to seek other witnesses who could verify or
legitimize the trial testimony of Christensen, Helms and Mark.
Prior to trial, Wasatch had not prepared to call any such
rebuttal witnesses. Certainly, it would have been a strategic
mistake for Wasatch to call witnesses who would discuss the
condition of the parking lot and testify regarding the lack of
falls on the parking lot.

To do so would have been to open the

door for the testimony which Wasatch had expressly tried to
exclude through its Motion for an Order in Limine.
The admission of the surprise testimony had a material
bearing on the case.

This testimony brought into doubt the

testimony of Wasatch's witnesses Burton Miller and Art Kersey,
who had testified that the maintenance personnel of Wasatch Manor
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had taken reasonable precautions to make the premises safe for
the tenants and that they had no notice of any prior falls
occurring on the premises.

The testimony of Helms, Christensen

and Mark indicated to the jury that the Wasatch's premises may
not have been safe and that at least Mr. Kersey had notice of
prior falls on the premises.

Thus, the surprise testimony

impeached the only witnesses called by Wasatch, and Wasatch had
no opportunity to try and produce other witnesses to rebut the
testimony of Helms, Christensen and Mark.
The jury's decision was undoubtedly influenced by the
surprise testimony, especially in light of the fact that in his
closing statement

Erickson's counsel emphasized that Wasatch

had not introduced any testimony of disinterested witnesses.
Did we hear from anybody in the defense camp
about the condition of that parking lot all
through that winter other than the manager and
the man who is supposed to salt it? Did they
bring anybody from their apartment to come here
to their aid and say, hey, it was always
salted. About did they bring anybody from the
county. I don't think you can reach any other
conclusion but that that place was always icy.
(R. 446 at p. 154).
The result of the trial would have been different had
it not been for the admission of the testimony of Ms. Helms, Ms.
Christensen, and Ms. Mark.

A brief interview of two jurors after

the trial indicated that the jury was greatly influenced by the
testimony of these witnesses, and that without such testimony the
jury would not have been able to enter a verdict of negligence on
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the part of Wasatch.

The jurors interviewed could not understand

why Wasatch had not called other disinterested tenants of Wasatch
Manor to rebut the testimony of Helms, Christensen and Mark.
Thus, there is certainly more than a reasonable
likelihood that Wasatch would have obtained a different result if
it had had an opportunity to prepare its defense with respect to
the testimony regarding the alleged prior and subsequent
falls.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20.
In determining whether a trial court committed
reversible error in giving a particular jury instruction, the
Court of Appeals must determine whether in absence of the alleged
error a more favorable result would have been obtained by
Wasatch.

Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah

1985); Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 22 (Utah
1983); Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, 26 Utah 2d 448,
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971).

It is the position of Wasatch that

Jury Instruction No. 20 was an incorrect statement of the law, it
incorrectly instructed the jury as to the standard of care
required of a landlord and misled the jury into applying a strict
liability type of standard to Wasatch.

Were it not for such

improper application of the landlord/tenant law, a reasonable
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jury would likely find that Wasatch had not met its standard of
care.
It is well established in Utah that the duty owed by a
landlord to his tenants and their guests is the duty to
exercise ordinary care to maintain the common areas in a
reasonably safe condition.

Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments,

Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988); Schofield v.
Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 511 P.2d 149, 151 (1973).

However, a

landlord is not an insurer of the safety of his tenants, and
merely because an injury results from a slip and fall upon ice
does not automatically create liabilities.

Gregory, 745 P.2d

at 91.
At trial, against the objections of Wasatch's
counsel, the Court gave Jury Instruction No. 20, which states in
pertinent part:
The defendant has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to maintain the common
walkways in reasonably safe condition for
tenants and guests. The defendant has a
further duty to observe any dangerous
condition known to him or which by the use
of reasonable diligence would have become
known to him and to take reasonable steps
to remedy or remove any such dangerous
condition.
(Emphasis added, R. 223-256, Appendix C.)

The first sentence

of the above quoted paragraph in Instruction No. 20 correctly
states the standard of care to be applied to a landlord.
However, the second sentence of the instruction imposes a
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higher duty of care on the landlord, akin to strict
liability.

It imposes an additional "further" duty on the

landlord beyond the duty of ordinary care, and that is a duty
to observe dangerous conditions and to take reasonable steps
to remedy or remove the dangerous condition.
It is clear, in light of Gregory v. Fourthwest
and Schofield v. Kinzell that no such extra duty may be
imposed upon a landlord, because a landlord is not a guarantor
of the safety of his tenants.
The mere accumulation of snow or ice does not
ipso facto make the landlord liable, he must be
given a reasonable time after the storm has
ceased to remove the accumulations or to take
such measures as will make the common areas
reasonably safe for those conditions which pose
an unreasonable risk of harm to the user.
Schofield, 511 P.2d at 151.

Therefore, in order to recover,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed and that sufficient time had elapsed to take
corrective action.

Gregory, 745 P. 2d at 91, citing Martin

v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977);
Schofield, 511 P.2d at 161.
In the case of Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
supra, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's directed
verdict for the defendant.

In that case, the plaintiff fell on a

sidewalk leading from the parking lot of a grocery store to the
main entrance of the store.

The evidence, taken in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that she fell at a
place in the sidewalk where there was a slight flaking of the
concrete, and where ice had accumulated.

565 P.2d at 1140. The

court found the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence to
show that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition and had
time to correct it.

The court held that it was not the duty of

persons in control of buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or to
take other steps necessary to prevent accumulation of moisture on
the sidewalk that might freeze and create an icy condition.

The

landowner, said the court, has no duty to seek out and mop dry
all depressions in the walkways and approaches to its buildings.
Id. at 1141.
Therefore, Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given
to the jury.

This instruction misled the jury into applying a

higher standard of care to Wasatch rather than ordinary care
under the circumstances.

Absent this instruction, a reasonable

jury would likely have found that Wasatch met its standard of
care.

The evidence presented at trial indicates that Wasatch

Manor fully performed its duty to Erickson.

Wasatch Manor had

contracted with an independent contractor for the removal of snow
from the parking lot. (R. 446 at p. 26)

In addition, Wasatch

Manor employees salted and/or de-iced the parking lot and
walkways three times a day.

(Id. at pp. 37-40)

If Wasatch

employees found ice covering the entire parking lot, they used a
fertilizer spreader to spread the salt or de-icer over the
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entire lot.

However, if ice was found in spots, Wasatch's

employees used a bucket and spread salt or de-icer by hand.
(Id. at pp. 38-40).

This procedure was a daily routine.

(Id. at pp. 34-35, 37-40).

This procedure was followed on

February 9, 1985, the day that Erickson claims to have fallen.
(Id.

at pp. 34-37).
These snow and ice removal procedures were more than

reasonable under the circumstances.

Instruction No. 20 imposed

upon Wasatch an additional obligation that was expressly rejected
by the Utah supreme Court in Martin v. Safeway Stores.
It is not the duty of persons in control of such
buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or to take
other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation
of moisture on the sidewalk that might freeze and
create an icy condition . . . and it cannot be
the duty of persons in control of such buildings
to seek out and mop dry all such depressions in
the walkways and approaches to such building.
Id. The court improperly instructed the jury as to a landlord's
standard of care to his tenants.
and was prejudicial to Wasatch.

This instruction was erroneous
(See Cornwell v. Barton,

18 Utah 2d 325, 442 P.2d 663 (1967) (case remanded for a new
trial because trial court committed prejudicial error in giving a
jury instruction which misstated the standard of care required of
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a landlord.)
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The proper standard of review on appeal for a denial of
a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion.

Moon Lake

Electric v. Ultra Systems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d
125, 128 (Utah App. 1988); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1982).

The trial court's ruling regarding a

motion for a new trial can be overturned if there is a showing
that the trial court's action was arbitrary, or that it clearly
transgressed any reasonable bounds of discretion.

Lembach v.

Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981); Hyland v. St. Mark's
Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967).

In the

present case, the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its
discretion in denying Wasatch's Motion for a new trial.
Wasatch's Motion was based on the grounds that it was
entitled to a new trial due (1) to the admission of surprise
testimony regarding prior and subsequent falls on Wasatch's
premises, and (2) because the trial court improperly gave Jury
Instruction No. 20. Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted to any party
on the basis of surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.

See also Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d

339, 341 (Utah 1979).

The trial court has broad discretion in
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granting or denying a motion for a new trial.

Donohue v.

Intermountain Health Care, 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987).
The factors required for a new trial based on surprise are:
(1) actual surprise, (2) the facts had a
material bearing on the case, (3) the
Court's decision mainly rested on these
facts (4) the surprise did not result from
the moving party's inattentiveness or
negligence, (5) the motion for new trial
was promptly filed, (6) the moving party
acted reasonably at the time of the
surprise, and (7) the result of a new trial
would probably be different.
In re Adoption of S.E., 755 P.2d 27, 31 (Mont. 1988).
In Wasatch's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
a New Trial, Wasatch argued that all the factors required for the
granting of a new trial on the grounds of surprise were met, as
more particularly briefed in Point I.B. of this Argument
(R. 373-384).

In addition, Wasatch argued in its Memorandum to

the court that Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given on
the grounds more particularly briefed in Point II of this
Argument.

(Id.).

However, the trial court denied Wasatch's

Motion on both grounds.

The court's Minute Entry stated only

that the court had reviewed the file, read the pleadings and
decided to deny the motion.

(R. 419). Under the circumstances

of this case, and as briefed in detail in the above two
arguments, Wasatch was entitled to a new trail.

The court's

failure to grant Wasatch's Motion, particularly without
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providing reasons therefore, was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion.
Erickson will undoubtedly argue, as he did in his
Memorandum in Response to Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial,
that Wasatch does not have a right to a new trial because it
failed to object to the admission of evidence at the time the
evidence was offered at trial.

However, as Wasatch's Reply

Memorandum argued to the trial court, counsel for Wasatch had
sufficiently objected to the admission of the testimony of Ms.
Helms, Ms. Christensen and Ms. Mark by: (1) filing and arguing a
Motion in Limine regarding the admissibility of such testimony
before the same judge as the one who presided over the trial, and
(2) by objecting and stating its position as to the admissibility
of such testimony on the last day of trial during the hearing
held on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider.
444, 446 at pp. 51-56).

(R. 60-71, 409-414,

In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,

1071-1072 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court of Utah held that where
a party has prior to trial moved to exclude evidence, he does not
need to object at trial or renew his pretrial motion in order to
preserve the issue at trial, if the trial judge is also the judge
who ruled on the pretrial motion and the record indicates that an
evidentiary hearing was held.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Wasatch seeks reversal of the Judgment
entered against it and Judgment in its favor as a matter of
law, or that failing, a new trial.

The trial court should not

have admitted testimony which was previously excluded by the
court's Order in Limine.

Wasatch had a right to rely upon the

guidelines set forth in that Order and to prepare its case for
trial accordingly.

The admission of this testimony at the last

minute greatly prejudiced Wasatch's defense.
Secondly, Instruction Number No. 20 incorrectly stated
the standard of care required of a landlord, and essentially
created a strict liability type of standard that the jury applied
to Wasatch.

Such an erroneous instruction is not supported by

Utah law.
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Wasatch's
Motion for a New Trial.

Wasatch was entitled to a new trial due

to the improper admission of the surprise testimony and due to
the improper jury instruction.
Judgment should be reversed.

Therefore, the trial court's
In the alternative, this Court

should remand this case for a new trial.
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& NELSON

Nelsdn L. Hayes
/)
u
Masuda A. Medcalf
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid on this 19th day of April, 1990, to the following
counsel of record:
Eric Bjorklund
Attorney for Plaintiff
3808 South West Temple, Suite ID
Salt Lake City, Uta 84111

W/,/),
ERICKS2/MAM
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

>* *

* * *

¥foiA4U
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C86-845
Transcript of:

v

BENCH RULING ON
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

WASATCH MANOR, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
* * *

BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE
Salt Lake City, Utah
Wednesday, April 5, 1989

APPEARANCES
For the Plintiff:

For the Defendant

REPORTER:

ERIC W. BJORKLUND
Attorney at Law
136 East So. Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
NELSON L. HAYES
Attorney at Law
50 South Main Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

SUZANNE WARNICK, RPR, CSR
Official Court Reporter
240 East 400 South, #A-534
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-535-5479

1**^6*1 Ss?\r*

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1989; 3:00

P.M.

BENCH RULING ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

THE COURT:

Well, let me rule then.

MR. BJORKLUND:

Your Honor, could I have a

brief other word.
THE COURT:

No.

It's his motion.

And I think

8 I you have covered your two motions, and he has the last
9

say.

Otherwise I'll have to let him say again.

10

I do grant the motion to amend the

11

Complaint.

12

As far as the plaintiff's motion for the

13

report of the expert, as the Court looks at the rule of

14

which has been brought up, when the defense does obtain

15

an expert in a field and obtains a report from him that

16

is going to be used for the case trial, that that

17

report, itself, when he has used that for his trial

18

preparation is not discoverable, although the witness

19

may be deposed.

20

given, and it saves a lot of expense and I guess time as

21

far as counsel is concerned.

22

I

I know in a lot of cases that it is

I would indicate this:

That if it's sure

23

that he is going to be used in his case in principle and

24

the plaintiff is definitely bringing in an engineer to

25

set forth his position, then I am going to allow or I am
2

1

going to be ordering that it be produced.

2

feel I am extending it there, except because of the fact

3

that you would just end up taking a deposition.

4

it's going to be a rebuttal situation, I am not going to

5

order it be produced.

6

to depose him if you wish to do so.

7

is any question on that.

8
9

And I really

But if

I would order that you be allowed
I donft think there

As far as the last issue is concerned, I
have not made a study of the slip and fall cases as far

10

as these prior accidents are concerned.

11

had some experience as far as an automobile accident

12

where there is a particular location in the highway of

13

where a number of accidents have taken place.

14

have not reviewed that either prior to taking the bench

15

on this, but I do remember some of the things they say.

16

And one of them is notice.

17

I know I have

And I

I do know that whether notice was given to

18

the city, the highway department, and so forth as far as

19

a dangerous condition is concerned, another thing they

20

look at is the time element, whether it was one month,

21

six months, five years, ten years and so forth.

22

course the main thing is whether the condition was the

23

same, the road signs were the same, the designation of

24

the road, the line down the center of the road, and so

25

forth, and things of this sort.

And of

3

Well, this gets very difficult when you start

1
2

talking about falls of 13, 15, 18 years ago.

And I am

3

going to rule this way:

4

evidence to show that there is, and he claims there is a

5

dangerous condition which exists in that parking lot,

6

engineer!ng, construction where it was negligently

7

constructed, where they made something that was

8

negligent or defective and that people have fallen as a

9

result of that, then I would allow prior falls.

That if the plaintiff has

If these prior falls are not in that same

10
11

location as far as the depressed area of which he

12

alleges i s defective, such as going down the ramp or

13

such as the other part of it, I just can't allow it.

14

They are just not relevant as far as the situation is

15

concerned

16

may have been five or ten years ago.

17

They may have fallen, and even some of them

But if he can tie it in to a defective

18

condition in construction, something of a negligent

19

nature, then I will allow it within the same area.

20

it sounds like to me there is only one that does this,

21

and that1 s the one on the west side of where somebody

22

walked out in back of their car and fell.

23

And

And I won't even allow that unless it can be

24

shown that there was a defect as far as the construction

25

which caused ice to form and people have been falling
4

1

there.

2

didnft give notice to the principle, Wasatch Manor.

Of course that's even weak because still they

If they had been given notice and didn't go

3
4

out and do anything to correct it, that's the bad thing,

5

And that's where it really becomes material.

6

am saying is if they didn't give notice.
I know Mr. Hayes what he is going to do if

7
8

So what I

you do put them on and establishes that there was no

9 I notice.

So I hope you understand my ruling.

I am

10

saying that I will not allow the prior falls unless it

11

can be established that there was a defective condition

12

there a nd they were falling as a result of that

13

defect!ve engineered condition.

14

MR. HAYES:

Thank you, your Honor.

15

MR. BJORKLUND:

Could I ask for just a point

16

of clar ification, your Honor, not a point intended to be

17

argued.

18

THE COURT:

Sure.

19

MR. BJORKLUND:

We do not intend at this point

20

in time to introduce evidence showing that it was

21

defect!vely constructed, but that the maintenance of the

22

parking lot in terms of piling the snow around the

23

perimeter and the subsequent salting could -- created an

24

on-goin g dangerous condition.

Now, I understand the

25 1 Court ' s ruling is a dangerous condition regarding the

5

construction.

We are saying, okay, itfs a parking lot

that's constructed the way it is.

Their negligence was

piling the snow the way they did all the way through the
winter and failing to salt.

Does that fall within the

same kind of dangerous condition?
THE COURT:

No.

I could not allow that of

where you talk of a fall of 15 -- 10, 15, 18 years ago.
There is no way that it can be tied in that that was
plowed the same way and the same type of conditions
existed.

And I would not allow it.

Does that clear it

up?
MR. HAYES:

Thank you, your Honor.

prepare the order.
THE COURT:

You prepare the order.

(This concludes the bench ruling.)
•
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*
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APPENDIX "B"

Eric W. Bjorklund
#0345
Attorney at Law
3808 South West Temple, Suite ID
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 262-9904
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

GUY ERICKSON,

:
Plaintiff,

:

VS.

:

WASATCH MANOR, INC.

:

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF
JODY CHRISTENSEN
Civil No. C86-845
J u d g e Wilkinson

:

Jody Christensen, having first been sworn on oath deposes and hereby
s t a t e s as follows:
1.

If called upon to testify in the above captioned matter her testimony

would be as follows:
2.

She was an employee at the Salt Lake A s s e s s o r ' s office during the

1984-1985 winter (Nov 1984 - March 1985) and parked at the Wasatch Manor
parking lot during said time.
3.

That the location of her parking slot is marked by the words

M

Parking

Place" on Exhibit A attached hereto which is a drawing of the Wasatch Manor
appartment's upper level parking lot.
4.

That she parked in said parking lot at least three times a week.

5. That she traveled a course indicated by the dotted line on the attached
Exhibit A when she would arive in the morning between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.
1

and when she would leave work at night between 5:00 p.m. and 5:45 p.m..
6.

That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed the conditions along

the dotted line and throughout the parking lot as it relates to ice.
7.

That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed that the parking lot

and the route along the dotted line were usually covered with ice and that she
considered the parking lot to be dangerous and negligently maintained.
8.

That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed the conditions along

the dotted line and throughout the parking lot as it relates to the existence of
salting.
9.

That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed that the parking lot

was rarely, if ever, salted.
10.

That during the last two weeks of December, 1984 or during the

month of January, 1985 she fell at the location marked "Fall" on the attached
Exhibit A.
11.

That she fell on black ice which was the same in appearance as that

ice that often observed along the dotted line and that she fell notwithstanding
her attempts to be reasonably cautious*
12.

That she was aware of the Wasatch Manor's parking lot's reputation

for ice or danger during the winter of 1984-85 among the employees of the
County Assessor's office.
13.

That the Wasatch Manor parking lot had a reputation as a dangeous

and icy place.
13.

That within days after the affiant's fall she talked with the Wasatch

Manor manager and indicated that the parking lot was unreasonably icy, that she
had fallen and that she would like to have permission to go through the foyer
instead of down the ramps when entering and leaving the parking lot.
2

14.

That she did not recal many of the facts indicated above at her

deposition in this matter. She did not understand what the deposition was about
prior to giving it and had not had any opportunity to consult her records or
to talk with others to attempt to refresh her recollection.
Dated this

S&

'- day of May,

1989.
OJ ,'*-*-*!
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NORTARY
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/ U)
day of May, 1989, appeared
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APPENDIX "C"

JURY INSTRUCTION NO 20

The defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary case to
maintain the common walkways in reasonably safe condition for
tenants and guests.

The defendant has a further duty to

observe any dangerous condition known to him or which by the
use of reasonable diligence would have become known to him and
to take reasonable steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous
condition.
However, the landlord is not a guarantor for the
safety of his tenants as they proceed along the common ways.
The mere accumulation of ice does not automatically
make the landlord liable.

He must be given a reasonable time

after the creation of the dangerous condition developed, to
take such measures as will make the common areas reasonably
safe from those conditions which pose an unreasonable risk of
harm to the user.

APPENDIX "D1

JUN 1 3 1989
Eric W. Bjorklund
#0345
Attorney at Law
3808 South West Temple. Suite ID
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 262-9904

, c& rr
^ ^
By-.iiJ I ~ I ^ ^
5iS*»«**
v

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP SALT LAKE, STATE OP UTAH

GUY ERICKSON,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
VS.
WASATCH MANOR, INC.

Civil No. C86-845
Judge Wilkinson

Defendant.

The trial of this matter was held on May 16, 1989 through and including
May 19, 1989 before an eight member jury, the Honorable Homer Wilkinson,
presiding.

The Plaintiff, Guy Erickson was present and represented by his

counsel, Eric W. Bjorklund.

The director of the Defendant, Wasatch Manor,

Burton Miller, was present, together with the Defendant's counsel, Nelson Hayes
and Masuda A. Medcalf.
The jury, after due deliberation, entered a judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendant for negligence and awarded damages to the
Plaintiff as follows: medical expenses of $9,820.15, lost income of $45,000.00 and
general damages of $30,000.00, for a total award of $84,820.15
THEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1.

Payment of special damages for the Plaintiff's medical expenses of

$9,820.15 and for the Plaintiff's lost income of $45,000.00.
2.

Payment of general damages of $30,000.00.

3. Payment of the Plaintiff's court costs in the amount of t 7 ' *4* Payment of interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry of the
judgment.

^ _ ^
DATED this

/J

day o » t a * , 1989.

CERTIFICATE OP HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was hand
delivered, to Nelson L Hayes, CAB Towers, Suite_700. 50 South Main Street, P.O.
Box 2465, Salt Lake Wty, Utah 84LW, this
'ZlvW
day May, 1989.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

A„-

..*'*

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ERICKSON, GUY
PLAINTIFF
VS
WASATCH MANOR, INC

CASE NUMBER 860900845 CV
DATE 08/07/89
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. BJORKLUND, ERIC W.
D. ATTY. HAYES, NELSON L.

4-501 RULING
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DATED JULY 27, 1989, THE COURT HAVING REVIEWED THE FILE AND READ THE PLEADINGS RULES AS FOLLOWS:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED.
CC NELSON HAYES, MASUDA MEDCALF, ERIC BJORKLUND

